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THE BENEFICENT MONOPOLIST
Allen P. Grunes * & Maurice E. Stucke**
Comcast has fired the opening salvo in defense of its proposed
acquisition of Time Warner Cable (TWC).

And as surely as spring

eventually follows a long winter, we will soon hear from many recipients of
Comcast’s charitable giving and community support (and likely also many
recipients of its campaign contributions) about why Comcast is a good
corporate citizen and deserves our full support for this latest mega-merger.
For Comcast knows how to play the monopoly game, which, as Judge
Richard Posner points out, involves not only a deadweight loss to society
but also the wasteful use of resources by a monopolist to defend its
monopoly. The playbook is captured and presented in detail in Susan
Crawford’s book Captive Audience, which is worth reading. And Comcast
executed the playbook almost flawlessly in connection with its earlier
acquisition of NBCUniversal.
So what are Comcast’s opening arguments? To the FCC, Comcast will
likely say: we will voluntarily advance your agenda even though the courts
have questioned your authority to regulate us in important ways. We are
willing to live by the net neutrality principles and cable ownership limits
you would like to have.
To DOJ, Comcast will likely say: we don’t compete with TWC, so the
merger does not lessen competition. We have our geographic markets, they
have their markets. Even if we were a monopoly provider, which we are
not, a merger of two monopolies does not violate the Clayton Act.
And to both agencies, Comcast will likely say: we are willing to extend
*
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the commitments we made in the NBCUniversal deal, so they now cover
TWC. Unless you are willing to admit you got it wrong back then, what
more could you ask for? The NBCUniversal deal was a game changer that
combined significant content and cable assets; the TWC deal is only a
geographic extension of Comcast’s cable territory. Since you let the earlier
merger go through, you should let this one go through too.
We recently outlined in another article why the Comcast/TWC merger
actually represents “crossing the Rubicon” and probably should be blocked
rather than conditioned. Our thought experiment was to suppose that the
predictions of the financial community and some members of the antitrust
bar were correct – namely, that the Comcast/TWC merger, while not sailing
through the regulatory process, is likely to remain relatively intact. If true,
we asked the following question: if Comcast can acquire TWC, what
prevents Comcast from extending its footprint across America by acquiring
the remaining cable companies? It seems difficult to discern a limiting
principle (other than Comcast’s voluntary commitment to limit its national
reach), since the same justification for the Comcast/TWC transaction could
be offered for another cable deal. Cable companies tend not to compete
with one another for customers.
The predictions that this merger will experience relatively smooth
sailing, we argue, may be wrong for several reasons:
•

First, a merger can violate section 7 of the Clayton Act without the
parties competing in the same geographic markets.

•

Second, the Congressional command for section 7 is to arrest a trend
toward concentration in its incipiency before the trend develops to
the point that a market is left in the grip of a few powerful
companies. One potential consequence of this merger is to
accelerate the trend toward concentration among content providers
and cable companies or other distributors. Indeed, arguably,
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Comcast itself set the stage for further consolidation when it entered
into the NBCUniversal joint venture.
•

Third, one reason Congress sought to thwart a market dominated by
a few firms is to prevent coordination or collusion. As evidenced by
the enforcement action involving the Verizon/Spectrum Co. deals,
where DOJ sought to limit what could be regarded as a truce
between Comcast and its most significant competitor, Verizon, we
are already beyond that point.

•

Fourth, Comcast’s “no-competitive-overlap” argument considers
only cable and Internet subscribers. It ignores how the competition
laws were also enacted to protect sellers from powerful buyers.
Thus, another concern is how the acquisition would increase
Comcast’s power to disadvantage sellers of video content.

•

Fifth, in investigating Comcast’s deal with General Electric that
ultimately enabled Comcast to control NBCUniversal, the DOJ
discussed various ways Comcast could disadvantage its traditional
video competitors (direct broadcast satellite and telephone
companies) plus the emerging online video programming
distributors (OVDs). In acquiring TWC, Comcast will have even
more power to raise the costs of its traditional video competitors and
also to thwart emerging OVD rivals by impairing or delaying the
delivery of their content.

Our focus here is to assess three of the arguments Comcast likely will
make. Comcast may argue that its acquisition of TWC is unlikely to lessen
competition because: (a) the broadband market is becoming more
competitive: Google has introduced Google Fiber in a number of markets,
and mobile broadband offered by wireless providers like AT&T and Sprint
is competitive with fixed broadband; (b) Netflix and traditional media
companies have sufficient clout to negotiate with Comcast and the
government should not intervene on their behalf; and (c) the “wide array of
FCC and antitrust rules and conditions from the NBCUniversal transaction
in place . . . more than adequately address any potential vertical foreclosure
concerns in the area of video programming.” We’ll consider each of these.
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“We have one competitor” in residential broadband . . . and it isn’t
Google
We know that Comcast, from its public pronouncements, does not see
itself as competing with TWC.

Focusing on high-speed residential

broadband, let’s ask the question: With whom does Comcast compete?
Speaking to a group of Wall Street analysts in 2011, Comcast’s CEO
Brian Roberts said that residential broadband “may be the best business we
are in.” Why? Among other reasons, broadband does not come with high
programming acquisition costs, like Comcast’s traditional video television
business. That can make it more profitable. And another reason broadband
is a good business to be in, according to Roberts, is Comcast’s ability to
increase prices. Comcast’s CEO put it bluntly in 2011: “We have one
competitor.” And that competitor, Verizon’s FiOS, was in only about 15%
of Comcast’s territories. In the same year, 2011, another cable veteran,
John Malone, was even blunter: “In broadband, other than in the FiOS area,
cable’s pretty much a monopoly now.”
Comcast and TWC are the largest providers of high-speed residential
broadband in the United States today. Post-merger, Comcast would become
by far the largest provider. While one can argue about what the DOJ should
count as “high-speed” when defining the relevant market, the market share
numbers and concentration levels are enormous any way you slice it, and
post-merger Comcast could easily approach or exceed 50% nationwide of
high-speed broadband, with higher shares in important local markets.
So what will Comcast likely argue in 2014? First, that Google Fiber,
and municipalities that are offering fiber to the home, represent significant
new broadband competition. Second, that wireless broadband speeds are
increasing to the point where wireless represents a true substitute to wired
broadband.
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But has the market really changed that much in the past 3 years?
Google, the world’s largest owner of fiber, as of early 2014 had rolled out
fiber

in

three

cities–perhaps

more

accurately

characterized

as

neighborhoods–and has recently started discussions with 9 more cities. Its
decisions about what markets to serve appear to be based on a number of
factors, including user demand and the level of governmental cooperation.
Google has said that its fiber project is not a loss leader; it needs to be selfsupporting. As to whether it plans to expand further, Google has publicly
stated, “Not for now.”
In this way, Google seems to be following Verizon’s footsteps, although
in an even more cautious and incremental way. Verizon decided to limit the
number of markets it serves with FiOS in order to get a significant return on
its investment. The prospect of either Google or municipalities displacing
Comcast any time soon as a cheap source of high-speed broadband seems
remote indeed.
Admittedly, TWC apparently increased its own broadband service’s
speed when Google entered Kansas City. But this only proves what most of
us know anyway: competition, when it happens, is generally good for
consumers.

Unfortunately, in many broadband markets, healthy

competition is rare.
A second argument Comcast is likely to make is that wireless Internet is
increasingly becoming a substitute for wired broadband. Although wireless
broadband speeds have increased and prices have declined, for most
consumers wireless represents more of a complement than a substitute. A
very small percentage of customers get their Internet exclusively from
wireless, and many of these do so because they cannot afford high-speed
broadband. The DOJ defined residential broadband as a separate product
market in 2012, and will likely define the market that way again.
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In sum, what Brian Roberts said in 2011 remains true in 2014. Comcast
has one broadband competitor. That competitor is present in only some of
Comcast’s geographic markets. And that situation is unlikely to change in
the next few years.
That is not the end of the antitrust inquiry, however. The question still
remains: how does the merger with TWC lessen competition? We can
think of several candidate theories, including most notably creating price
discrimination opportunities that were not possible before, and putting
Comcast into a position to pick winners and losers among innovative tech
companies that rely on high-speed broadband. Professors Spencer Weber
Waller, Brett Frischmann and others have argued that the Internet is a form
of infrastructure (Professor Crawford compares it to electricity or water)
and the essential facilities doctrine still has a legitimate role to play to
protect economic innovation in such infrastructure industries.
Where in the world are the content companies and Netflix?
Where are the traditional content companies (Disney, Fox, CBS, and
Viacom) in all of this? Without a serious and sustained effort by at least
one significant content company in opposition to the Comcast/TWC
merger, the chances of it being blocked would appear slim. Why? Because
one likely candidate theory of harm is that the merger increases Comcast’s
buyer power and adversely affects content providers. If the “victims” of
this harm sit on the sidelines, or offer at most tepid opposition to the
merger, then it will be harder for DOJ to enjoin the merger.
Here we can see Comcast perhaps going one step further today than it
did in its NBCUniversal playbook. In that merger, Comcast apparently
made concessions to parties who were unhappy and complained to the DOJ
or FCC. Network affiliates, independent producers, and others proved that
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the squeaky wheel gets the oil. This time around, Comcast would likely be
inclined to a more proactive strategy. Don’t wait for complaints. Use a
carrot and stick approach to lower the number and volume of complaints the
agencies are likely to receive.

A carrot:

offer deals (sweetheart or

otherwise) to likely would-be complainants. The stick Comcast need not
publicize: companies that complain about Comcast’s behavior must resort
to regulatory arbitration or judicial proceedings. That should serve as a
warning.
Because the terms of Netflix’s recent deal with Comcast have not been
publicly disclosed, we do not know to what extent, if any, Comcast’s deal
with Netflix illustrates the carrot. But Netflix was very likely a potential
complainant. In investigating Comcast’s deal with General Electric that
ultimately enabled Comcast to control NBCUniversal, DOJ discussed
various ways Comcast could disadvantage the emerging OVDs. Netflix and
other OVDs rely on Internet service providers like Comcast and TWC to
deliver their television shows and movies to subscribers. Thus the growth of
OVDs, as the DOJ found, “depends, in part, on how quickly [Internet
service providers] expand and upgrade their broadband facilities and the
preservation of their incentives to innovate and invest.” For its part, Netflix
had raised concerns in that past about “Comcast either discriminating
against Netflix traffic or trying to increase Netflix’s operating costs.” In
acquiring TWC, Comcast would have even more power to thwart Netflix or
other emerging OVD rivals by impairing or delaying the delivery of their
content.
Based on Netflix’s statements in its prior SEC filings and the DOJ
findings, it appears that Netflix has much to lose from this merger. Netflix
represents the most successful OVD to date, and thus a significant threat to
bundled cable service over the long haul. But Netflix needs to get into
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customers’ homes, which means it needs Comcast and TWC.
In the best of all worlds, broadband would be delivered by companies
whose incentives align with those of consumers and OVDs, like Netflix.
Ideally the OVDs’ incentive is to innovate and unbundle so as to entice
customers to switch from cable. This would spur both cable companies and
OVDs to better serve consumers.
In the real world, however, OVDs have to reach many homes through
Comcast, a company that (a) is threatened by OVDs over the long term; (b)
can affect the consumer experience negatively; and (c) has an
overwhelming incentive to sell broadband, cable and telephone in a bundle
as opposed to individually.

The Comcast/TWC merger more likely

worsens, rather than improves, these problems. Rather than rely on the
regulatory complaint procedures, Netflix cut its own deal, and reportedly
will pay Comcast “for faster and more reliable access to Comcast’s
subscribers.”
Netflix’s deal with Comcast should not be viewed as removing Netflix
as a complainant. Indeed Netflix called the deal an “arbitrary tax” that
demonstrates Comcast’s “leverage.” (For its part, Comcast characterized
the Netflix deal as “an amicable, market-based solution.”)

Generally

companies that make deals with merging parties do not complain
immediately thereafter to the DOJ or FCC. It makes more sense for the
company to see whether other firms take the lead and incur the cost to hire
antitrust lawyers (and economists) to persuade the agency of the likely
anticompetitive effects. Thus its multi-year deal with Comcast may reduce
Netflix’s incentive to attack the merger. Indeed, Netflix may have the ticket
to survive, while other OVDs perish.
And then there is the stick. Another reason content companies and
others may stay quiet is out of fear of retaliation, notwithstanding the
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behavioral conditions that the FCC and DOJ imposed as part of the
Comcast/NBCUniversal transaction.

Companies have reason to fear

retaliation if the TWC merger goes through—even with additional
conditions. The multiyear legal battle by Bloomberg News to be carried in
the vicinity of other news stations (including those owned by Comcast) is
an obvious example.

And the apparently ill-fated decision by Project

Concord to seek arbitration under the FCC Order is another example. It
would

not

be

surprising

if

some

media

companies

see

the

Comcast/NBCUniversal decree and order as providing weak protection to
companies that complain.
If the agencies’ current behavioral conditions are ineffective and if the
threat of retaliation by Comcast is real, then the content providers may
prefer to negotiate a deal with Comcast and stay quiet. So some content
providers’ silence—or hope that the government will “look carefully” at the
merger, as one has put it—may not reflect their approval of the transaction,
but their fear.
Beyond this carrot and stick approach, it is worth asking whether the
content suppliers are likely to complain. Perhaps some will, but there are
reasons to think that others will not.

One reason is to compare their

experience with Comcast and TWC and their experience with technology
companies and other innovators. Occasionally war breaks out between the
content providers and cable companies – most recently the disagreement
between CBS and TWC. But those flare-ups tend to be infrequent, partly
due to some “mutually assured destruction” when they happen. And, at
least in its recent battle with CBS, TWC came out the loser by one measure,
losing approximately 306,000 cable (but not broadband) subscribers.
Indeed, that battle may have contributed to TWC’s decision to sell.
Contrast this with some of the innovation (and litigation over such
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innovation) that is starting to appear in the Internet world and that may
represent a bigger threat to content companies.

Aereo captures free

broadcast-TV signals, distributes them over the Internet, and avoids paying
retransmission fees.

This represents a major threat to the networks’

business model, and the Supreme Court will soon be weighing in. DISH’s
Hopper allows subscribers to skip over ads, representing another threat.
Meanwhile, Cablevision has sued Viacom over alleged tying between musthave and less desirable programming. The suit, if successful, may lead to
unbundling of content. And of course Viacom sued Google’s YouTube for
looking the other way and enabling copyright violations. That suit only
recently settled.
So which is worse from the content companies’ perspective: a merger
that strengthens Comcast’s negotiating power and extends its broadband
monopoly, or keeping Comcast and TWC separate, and thus potentially
making it easier for online businesses like Apple, Google, Amazon, Hulu,
and Netflix to gain more traction, and smaller distributors like Cablevision
to push for unbundled programming or a legislative change to the
retransmission consent rules? It’s a tough call. CBS, for example, could
lose if the merger goes through as it reportedly receives lower fees from
Comcast than from TWC. But CBS also reportedly has solid relations with
Comcast. CBS Chief Executive Leslie Moonves recently praised Comcast
for believing in “paying fairly for content.” Other content suppliers may not
mind a larger Comcast if they can all agree to divide the spoils (by perhaps
charging consumers even more). So some of the large content suppliers
may reasonably decide that a bigger monopoly, like Comcast, is the lesser
of two evils.
In sum, one potential problem, from the government’s standpoint, is that
several prominent companies who are adversely affected by the increase in
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bargaining power brought about by the merger may be unlikely to lead the
charge against it. Sprint led the charge in opposing the AT&T/T-Mobile
merger, and contributed legal and economic firepower to the DOJ’s case.
Without a committed opponent, the government may be less likely to
litigate. And smaller cable systems, independent content providers, or startup OVDs are unlikely to successfully navigate the investigatory process to
make up the difference.
But the fact that most of the major content suppliers may choose not to
oppose the merger (or to mute their opposition) does not mean that the deal
is pro-competitive or even competitively neutral. The DOJ’s recent success
in the Bazaarvoice litigation shows that a merger can be successfully
challenged in court as anticompetitive even though few speak up against it.
Even if the voices that should be speaking out are mute or muted, if the
merger, as the facts reflect, violates the Clayton Act, the DOJ should
challenge it.
The Comcast/NBCUniversal decree and order – not a good
blueprint
The

FCC’s

Order

approving

Comcast/NBCUniversal

tried

to

accomplish quite a few things. According to the FCC’s announcement,
As part of the merger, Comcast-NBCU will be required to take
affirmative steps to foster competition in the video marketplace. In
addition, Comcast-NBCU will increase local news coverage to
viewers; expand children’s programming; enhance the diversity of
programming available to Spanish-speaking viewers; offer
broadband services to low-income Americans at reduced monthly
prices; and provide high-speed broadband to schools, libraries and
underserved communities, among other public benefits.
The

companion

DOJ

consent

decree

required

the

Comcast/NBCUniversal joint venture to make available to OVDs the same

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416565

12

THE BENEFICENT MONOPOLIST

[26-Mar-14

package of broadcast and cable channels that it sold to traditional video
programming distributors. In addition, the joint venture was required to
offer an OVD broadcast, cable, and film content that was similar to the
content the online distributor received from one of the joint venture’s
programming “peers.” Comcast also agreed to relinquish its management
rights in Hulu.
The FCC order and the DOJ consent decree and their reliance on
behavioral remedies and conditions were, and remain, controversial as a
solution to competitive problems. Comcast’s willingness to extend the
conditions to TWC heightens the concern with the remedies that, in
hindsight, do not appear to have been particularly effective.
We’ll focus on a couple of features that may be most relevant to the
present deal:

The FCC’s requirement that Comcast “offer standalone

broadband Internet access services at reasonable prices and of sufficient
bandwidth so that customers can access online video services without the
need to purchase a cable television subscription from Comcast” and DOJ’s
provision for online video services to get the same rates as Comcast’s
“peers.”
Mandating that Comcast sell stand-alone high-speed Internet service
necessarily injected the FCC into what speed to require and how much
Comcast could charge. It also created a need for ongoing oversight. But
neither the FCC nor DOJ know what a competitive market could bring.
That is a fatal flaw of behavioral remedies. Comcast continues to deliver
expensive and (according to some critics) inferior broadband. In the U.S.,
Comcast is as much as 100 times slower than Google Fiber and other stateof-the-art Internet service providers. And there is even less incentive for
Comcast, after acquiring TWC, to innovate and compete. Moreover, the
problems that arose in how the FCC order was implemented show why a
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partially regulatory solution that is at odds with a company’s business
strategy is unlikely to work, except as a temporary fix. When Comcast
failed to comply fully with its obligations to offer stand-alone broadband,
the FCC’s recourse was to insist on more training of the Comcast sales
force, negotiate a civil penalty (euphemistically called a “voluntary
contribution to the United States Treasury”), and extend the requirement for
a year.
What was new about the DOJ case against Comcast and NBCUniversal
was its focus on innovation—in this case, innovation by OVDs like Hulu,
Netflix, Apple, and others that offer consumers ways to access professional,
full-length content on demand over the Internet. OVDs have a variety of
business models, including ad-supported programming that is free to the
user (Hulu), unlimited streaming for a monthly subscription fee (Netflix),
and the purchase or rental of an individual show (Apple).
According to DOJ, these OVDs were relatively recent entrants into
video distribution.

They have grown in popularity, especially among

younger viewers who want on-demand viewing and choice among devices.
DOJ noted that dozens of companies were innovating and experimenting
with online video distribution, with new developments occurring “almost
daily.”
DOJ found that “[t]oday, some consumers regard OVDs as acceptable
substitutes for at least a portion of their traditional video programming
distribution services” and either buy smaller content packages from
traditional distributors or are “cutting the cable cord” altogether.

DOJ

added that while OVDs had a “de minimis” share of the overall market,
growing demand would likely strengthen the competitive challenge they
pose to traditional distributors.
The DOJ consent decree was designed to protect early stage competition
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by OVDs, with a view that those firms may represent the “next big thing.”
And while it may be fair to say that DOJ (and consumers) had hoped for
more OVD expansion by now, still there are bright spots that suggest this
form of delivery of full length video programming is developing. Amazon
prime, YouTube’s original content, Dish’s over the top deal with Disney,
and Apple’s desire to enter the market all reflect positively on what may be
coming down the pike.
So it may be too early to judge the success or failure of the DOJ decree
on protecting this nascent competition. However, one thing that does seem
clear is that the Comcast/TWC merger could stifle these bright spots.
Already, following Netflix’s example, we are hearing rumors of other
OVDs considering cutting deals with Comcast. The existing DOJ consent
decree was inadequate to protect Netflix from Comcast’s power to impose
an “arbitrary tax.” After acquiring TWC and even more pathways into
consumers’ homes, Comcast, it appears, will have greater power to
arbitrarily “tax” other OVDs.
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that Senator Obama, while a presidential
candidate, spoke against media consolidation and the prior administration’s
failure to block anticompetitive media mergers, while President Obama may
be presiding over not one but two mega-media mergers by Comcast that
have significant competitive consequences for how Americans get their
news, video programming, and information. To Comcast, acquiring rival
cable and broadband providers is just business as usual. It’s just the size of
the check that is bigger this time.
Fifty-two percent of Americans in one recent Reuters/Ipsos poll
believed that deals such as Comcast/TWC result in less competition and are
bad for consumers (with only 22 percent believing that such mergers will
allow cable and Internet providers to be more efficient and provide better
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Those with college degrees were even more

negative of the deal (62 percent). Forty-two percent disapproved of the
government’s efforts in preventing monopolies and ensuring competition.
Notwithstanding Comcast’s and TWC’s assertions, combining two
monopolies does not yield better service, lower retail prices, more
innovation, and greater choices for consumers.

Nor should the DOJ and

FCC simply extend the prior behavioral remedies to this merger.
Behavioral remedies are a poor substitute for market competition. Comcast
and TWC have not overcome the presumption of illegality for this merger
and are unlikely to do so. As was the case with AT&T/T-Mobile, DOJ
should just say no.
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